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Abstract
During the 1990s, Japan began experiencing demographic
changes that are larger and more rapid than in other OECD coun-
tries. These demographic changes will become even more pronounced
in future years. We are interested in understanding the role of lower
fertility rates and aging for the evolution of Japan’s saving rate. We
use a computable general equilibrium model to analyze the response
of the national saving rate to changes in demographics and total factor
productivity. In our model aging accounts for 2 to 3 percentage points
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1of the 9 percent decline in the Japanese national saving rate between
1990 and 2000 and persistently depresses Japan’s national saving rate
in future years.
1 Introduction
Between 1961 and 1990 the national saving rate in Japan averaged over
16 percent of output. It exceeded 10 percent in all years except 1983 and
as recently as 1990 was 15 percent. For purposes of comparison, the United
States saving rate in 1990 was 9 percentage points lower, or about 6 percent.1
Since 1990, however, Japan’s saving rate has experienced a sharp decline. By
2000 it had fallen to 5.7 percent. Associated with this decline in the Japanese
saving rate has been a concurrent decline in the after-tax real return on
capital, or after-tax real interest rate, from 6 percent in 1990 to 4 percent in
2000, and low economic growth.2
Is this sharp decline in Japan’s national saving rate a temporary aberra-
tion from its historical average of 16 percent or is the national saving rate
likely to remain low in future years? We ﬁnd that this decline is highly per-
sistent and that the Japanese saving rate will average less than 5 percent in
future years even if there is a robust recovery in TFP growth.
This ﬁnding is based on modeling two principal determinants of the na-
tional saving rate. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and Chen, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2006a) emphasize the important role of total factor productiv-
ity (TFP) growth in understanding investment and saving patterns in Japan.
We also ﬁnd that TFP growth is an important determinant of variation in
observed Japanese saving rates since 1961. In addition, it is an important
factor, although not the dominant one, in accounting for the long-run decline
in saving predicted by our model.
The second major factor underlying our prediction of persistently low
Japanese saving rates is demographics. Japan is now experiencing demo-
1The national saving rate is deﬁned as net national saving divided by net national
product. Our data source for Japan is Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and for the United
States it is the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
2Our measure of the after-tax real interest rate is the after-tax real return on capital
and is taken from Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
2graphic changes that are large by both historical and international standards.
According to government projections, the level of the Japanese population
will decline from 127.7 million to 100.6 million between 2006 and 2050. Other
countries are experiencing demographic change, but Japan is particularly in-
teresting because the changes have been larger and more sudden than else-
where. In 1980 only 9.1 percent of the Japanese population was aged 65 and
above, a lower percentage than in all but one (Turkey) of the 23 other OECD
member countries. By 1990, this ﬁgure had increased to 12.1 percent, but
Japan was still the youngest of the G6 group of large, developed countries.
By 2005, though, fully 19.9 percent of the Japanese population was aged 65
and above, the highest proportion in the OECD. This ﬁgure is projected to
increase further to 36 percent by 2050.
We investigate the role of TFP growth and demographics for the future
course of the national saving rate using a computational general equilibrium
model as in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). Our model maintains the life-
cycle hypothesis of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), a choice motivated by
recent ﬁndings of Hayashi (1995) and Horioka, et al. (2000). Hayashi (1995)
estimates Engel curves for Japanese households and ﬁnds that they are incon-
sistent with the hypothesis that bequest motives are important. Horioka, et
al. (2000) argue, more generally, that survey evidence of Japanese households
is much more consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis than the alternatives
of altruistic or dynastic households. In a model populated by overlapping
generations (OLG) of life-cycle consumers, demographic changes such as the
aging of a baby boom generation, lower fertility, and increased longevity can
cause signiﬁcant changes in the national saving rate. In our model, house-
holds are formed when individuals reach age 21 and become economically
active. Households have one adult and a varying number of children who
consume a ﬁxed fraction of the adult’s consumption. The number of children
varies with the age of the adult and over time. Households may survive until
a maximum age of 100 and are assumed to interact in perfectly competitive
markets in a closed economy.3
3Japan is one of the largest economies in the world both in terms of aggregate and per
capita GDP. Japan also has the smallest trade-to-GDP ratios for both goods and services
in the OECD. For instance, in 2001 the trade-to-GDP ratio for goods was 9.3% in the
3We consider three distinct sources of variation in saving rates and real in-
terest rates: changes in fertility rates, changes in survival rates, and changes
in the growth rate of TFP.4 The interaction of fertility rates and survival
rates jointly determines the age distribution of the population at any point
in time. By varying fertility rates and survival rates, we capture the eﬀects of
the Japanese baby boom, the ensuing permanent decline in fertility and the
permanent increase in longevity on the age distribution and thus on aggre-
gate saving and other macroeconomic variables. For example, the baby boom
acts to increase the national saving rate in years when the baby boomers are
of working age and then to reduce saving as they retire. A permanent de-
cline in fertility or mortality rates reduces the fraction of workers (savers) in
the population and increases the fraction of the elderly (dis-savers). These
demographic changes can also aﬀect saving behavior at each age at given
factor prices. For example, lower fertility implies that fewer children are
present in households during working years. This acts to reduce consump-
tion and increase asset accumulation before retirement, and then to reduce
saving at older ages as these assets are consumed. Given the retirement age,
lower mortality rates (and thus a longer life expectancy) tend to increase
asset holdings throughout the life cycle. In a closed economy, all of these
changes aﬀect factor prices, to which consumption (and labor supply) also
respond.5 The overall response of the national saving rate depends on the
model parameterization. In an OLG model calibrated to Spanish data, Rios-
United States and 8.4% in Japan and the ratio of services to GDP was 2.4% and 2.3%
respectively. For these reasons we think it reasonable to assume that real interest rates
are determined in the domestic market in Japan.
4In explaining the historical behavior of Japanese saving and interest rates, we also
permit time variation in the depreciation rate and various indicators of ﬁscal policy, in-
cluding government purchases, tax rates, the public debt, and the size of the public pension
system.
5Demographics also aﬀect the saving rate via the same mechanisms that operate in a
one-sector neoclassical growth model populated by inﬁnitely-lived agents with log utility
over consumption. In that model, lower fertility results in capital deepening, which may
either increase or decrease the national saving rate. Along the balanced growth path
the marginal product of capital is increasing in the population growth rate. However,
net investment depends on the capital-output ratio and may either increase or decrease
with the population growth rate depending on the capital share parameter and the rate
of depreciation on investment.
4Rull (2001) ﬁnds that a permanent aging of the population lowers the saving
rate. Aging makes labor scarce relative to capital and this lowers the real
interest rate and the national saving rate. Henrikson (2005) considers a two
country model with trade and ﬁnds that aging in Japan will erase Japan’s
trade surplus with the United States in future years.
Changes in the growth rate of productivity can also have large eﬀects on
the national saving rate. Hayashi and Prescott (2002), for instance, have
found that the productivity slowdown in the 1990s produces big declines
in private investment in a representative-agent, real-business-cycle model.
Chen, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2005, 2006a, 2006b) ﬁnd that changes
in TFP growth alone can explain much of the variation in the Japanese saving
rate over the last four decades of the twentieth century.6
Before using the model to analyze the persistence of the recent decline in
Japanese saving, we ﬁrst assess its ability to reproduce movements in histor-
ical data. We calibrate the model to Japanese data and conduct a perfect
foresight dynamic simulation analysis starting from 1961. This solution tech-
nique requires that the entire trajectory of demographic variables and TFP
be speciﬁed. Our baseline speciﬁcation uses historical Japanese data for the
demographic variables and TFP for the period up to 2000. For future years
we use the Japanese government’s intermediate population projections and
assume that annual TFP growth recovers to 2 percent between 2000 and
2010.
Our model is reasonably successful in reproducing the observed year-to-
year pattern of Japanese saving rates in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The
Japanese national saving rate was 22 percent in 1961, 24 percent in 1970,
6Changes in unemployment risk can also aﬀect saving and interest rates. Unemploy-
ment rates in Japan rose from 2.2 percent in 1990 to 5.5 percent in 2003. Moreover,
between 1990 and 2000 the median duration spell of unemployment rose from 3.5 months
to 5.5 months and the replacement rate fell from 0.84 to 0.68. If this risk is largely unin-
surable then households will respond to it by increasing their demand for savings. The
general equilibrium eﬀects described in Aiyagari (1994) then imply that the real interest
rate will also fall. Braun et al. (2005) simulated steady-state versions of our model incor-
porating unemployment risk and found that the measured increase in unemployment risk
during the 1990s had a much smaller impact on saving and interest rates than either TFP
or fertility rates. The eﬀects of TFP and fertility on the saving rate were about equal in
size.
511 percent in 1980, 15 percent in 1990 and 6 percent in 2000. Our model
yields a saving rate of 23 percent in 1961, 20 percent in 1970, 8 percent in
1980, 14 percent in 1990 and 7 percent in 2000. The model also reproduces
movements in the after-tax return on capital and output growth and the
secular decline in Japanese hours worked between 1961 and 1990.
We then examine the persistence of the decline in Japanese saving by
documenting the model’s projections. In the baseline model the national
saving rate does not exceed 3.3 percent through the end of the twenty-ﬁrst
century.7 The aging of Japan’s baby-boom generation and lower birth rates
play an important role in these projections. If instead the demographic
variables are held ﬁxed at their values from the 1980s, the saving rate rises
to nearly 8 percent by 2045.
We check the robustness of these projections by varying the conditioning
assumptions for the demographic variables, TFP, government debt and risk
aversion. In all cases, the saving rate remains at or below 5 percent through
the year 2093. On the basis of these results we conclude that the Japanese
saving rate will remain low through the end of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
Our work is related to research by Hayashi, Ito, and Slemrod (1988),
who investigate the role of imperfections in the Japanese housing market
in accounting for the Japanese saving rate in an overlapping generations
endowment economy. They ﬁnd that the combination of rapid economic
growth, demographics, and housing market imperfections explains the level
of Japanese saving rates in 1980. Their projections, which condition on an
unchanged real interest rate, show declines in the saving rate of about 10
percent between 2000 and 2030.
Our work is also closely related to but distinct from that of Chen, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu,
and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2005, 2006b). They ﬁnd that convergence from a low initial
capital stock in conjunction with changes in TFP growth can explain most
of the variation in the Japanese saving rate in historical data prior to 2000.
7These projections are long-run trend values of the saving and interest rates. They are
based on the assumption that fertility and mortality rates, the TFP growth rate, and ﬁscal
policy variables evolve smoothly over time. As with any projection, high-frequency shocks
to any of these variables would produce additional ﬂuctuations in saving and interest rates.
In addition, shocks to variables not present in our model, e.g., monetary policy, could also
induce high-frequency variation in these variables.
6They employ an overlapping generations model but assume that labor supply
is exogenous and that the family scale is ﬁxed over the life cycle.8 Our model
incorporates an endogenous labor supply decision and allows family scale to
vary with age and over time in a way that is consistent with the fraction
of the Japanese population under 21 years of age. Both of these generaliza-
tions have implications for household saving decisions. Modeling variations
in family scale also turns out to play an important role in reproducing the
secular decline in Japanese hours worked.
Our objective is to assess the roles of TFP and demographics in future
years. We ﬁnd that variation in TFP growth plays an important role in our
model’s projections prior to 2020. Over longer horizons, however, demo-
graphic factors are much more important and account for the majority of
the decline in the national saving rate from its 1990 level.
The remainder of the paper is divided into ﬁve sections. In section 2 we
describe the model economy, while section 3 reports its calibration. Section
4 evaluates the model’s ability to explain the observed behavior of saving
and interest rates since 1961 and section 5 reports our projections. Section
6 contains our conclusions.
2 Model
2.1 Demographic Structure
This economy evolves in discrete time. We will index time by t where t ∈
{...,−2,−1,0,+1,+2,...}. Households can live at most J periods and J
cohorts of households are alive in any period t. They experience mortality
risk in each period of their lifetime.
Let Nj,t denote the number of households of age j in period t. Then the
8Chen, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2006a) consider an inﬁnite horizon representa-
tive agent model with a labor supply decision.
7dynamics of population are governed by the ﬁrst-order Markov process:
Nt+1 =

   

(1 + n1,t) 0 0 ... 0
ψ1,t 0 0 ... 0
0 ψ2,t 0 ... 0
............................
0 0 0 ψJ−1,t 0

   

Nt ≡ ΓtNt, (1)
where Nt is a J × 1 vector that describes the population of each cohort
in period t, ψj,t is the conditional probability that a household of age j in
period t survives to period t + 1 and ψJ,t is implicitly assumed to be zero.
The growth rate of the number of age-1 households between periods t and
t + 1 is n1,t, which we will henceforth refer to as the net fertility rate.9 The





The population growth rate is then given by nt = Nt+1/Nt. The uncondi-
tional probability of surviving from birth in period t − j + 1 to age j > 1 in
period t is:
πj,t = ψj−1,t−1πj−1,t−1 (3)
where π1,t = 1 for all t.
2.2 Firm’s Problem







9Note that this usage diﬀers from other common deﬁnitions of the fertility rate and
that the net fertility rate, as we have deﬁned it, can be negative, indicating a decline in the
size of the youngest cohort from one period to the next. We compute quantities analogous
to n1,t from Japanese data and use these values to parameterize our model. We use our
deﬁnition of the fertility rate to describe both the model quantities and their empirical
counterparts.
8where Yt is the output which can be used either for consumption or invest-
ment, Kt is the capital stock, Ht is eﬀective aggregate labor input and At





t . We will assume that the the market for goods and
the markets for the two factor inputs are competitive. Then labor and capital











where rt is the rental rate on capital and wt is the wage rate per eﬀective
unit of labor. The aggregate capital stock is assumed to follow a geometric
law of motion
Kt+1 = (1 − δt)Kt + It (7)
where, It, denotes aggregate investment and δt is the depreciation rate which
is assumed to vary over time.
2.3 Household’s Problem
All households have one adult and a varying number of children. The number
of children varies with the age of the adult and also over time.11 The utility






where β is the preference discount rate, cj,t is total household consumption
for a household of age j in period t = s+j−1 and ηj,t is the scale of a family
of age j in period t.
10As described below, labor eﬃciency is assumed to vary with age, so that changes in
the age distribution of the population alter the average eﬃciency of the labor force. This
eﬀect is measured by Ht, while changes in eﬃciency due to technical progress are captured
by At.
11We thank a referee for suggesting that we model time-variation in the family scale.
9Households are born with zero assets but may borrow against their future
income. Labor supply of a household of age j in period t is 1 − `j,t. Labor
income is determined by an eﬃciency-weighted wage rate wtεj per unit of
labor supplied, where wt denotes the market wage rate per unit of eﬀective
labor in period t and εj denotes the time-invariant eﬃciency of an age-j
worker. The eﬃciency index εj is assumed to drop to zero for all j ≥ Jr,
where Jr is the retirement age. The budget constraint for a household of age
j in period t is:
cj,t + aj,t ≤ Rtaj−1,t−1 + wtεj(1 − `j,t) + bj,t + ξt − θj,t (9)
where aj,t denotes assets held at the end of period t (with a0,t = 0 for all t),
θj,t,are taxes imposed by the government, bj,t denotes public pension (social
security) beneﬁts, and ξt is a uniform, lump-sum government transfer to all
individuals alive in period t, and Rt = 1 + rt − δt. Here, δt denotes the
depreciation rate of capital in period t. The pension beneﬁt bj,t is assumed
to be zero before age Jr and a lump-sum payment thereafter.
Taxes imposed by the government are given by
θj,t = τ
a
t (Rt − 1)aj−1,t−1 + τ
`
twtεj(1 − `j,t) (10)
where τa and τ` are the tax rates on income from capital and labor, respec-
tively.
2.4 Household’s Decision Rules
We summarize the individual situation of an age-j household in period t with
the state variable xj,t. The individual state consists solely of asset holdings
aj−1,t−1 : xj,t = {aj−1,t−1}. The aggregate state of the economy, denoted
Xt, is composed of total factor productivity, At, the depreciation rate, δt,
the family scale, ηt = {η1,t,η2,t,...ηJ,t}, government policy, Ψt, the period t
age-asset proﬁle xt = {x1,t,x2,t,...,xJ,t}, and the population distribution, Nt
or Xt ≡ {At,δt,ηt,Ψt,xt,Nt}.12 Households are assumed to know the entire
path of Xt except xt when they solve their problems. With these various
12The elements of Ψt are deﬁned in Section 2.5 below.
10deﬁnitions and assumptions in hand, we can now state Bellman’s equation







cj,t + aj,t ≤ R(Xt)aj−1,t−1 + w(Xt)εj(1 − `j,t) + bj,t + ξt − θj,t (12)
cj,t ≥ 0, 0 ≤ `j,t ≤ 1 (13)
Kt+1 = K(Xt) (14)
Ht = H(Xt) (15)
and given {At,δt,ηt,Ψt,Nt}∞
t=s and the laws of motion for the aggregate capi-
tal stock and labor input where s is the household’s birth year. Since a house-
hold dies at the end of period J, VJ+1,t = 0 for all t. A solution to the house-
hold’s problem consists of a sequence of value functions: {Vj(xj,t;Xt)}J
j=1 for




The government raises revenue by taxing income from labor and capital at the
ﬂat rates τ`, and τa, respectively. It receives additional revenue by imposing





(1 − ψj−1,t−1)R(Xt)aj−1,t−1(xj−1,t−1;Xj−1,t−1)Nj−1,t−1 (16)




θj,t(xj,t;Xj,t)Nj,t + Zt (17)
Note that θj,t depends on {xj,t;Xj,t} since it is a function of `j,t by (10).
11Total government expenditure is the sum of government purchases, public
pension beneﬁts, interest on the public debt, and lump-sum transfers. Gov-






We assume that the household’s pension beneﬁt bj,t is proportional to its
average wage before retirement and is constant after retirement. The house-
holds pension beneﬁt bj,t is given by
bj,t =
(
0 for j = 1,2,...,jr − 1
bjr,t+jr−j for j = jr,jr + 1,...,J
(19)
where jr is the retirement age. Then the constant amount of real beneﬁts






wt+i−jj(1 − lj,t+i−j) (20)
where λ is the replacement ratio of the pension beneﬁt. The public debt is
set exogenously and evolves according to
Dt+1 = R(Xt)Dt + Gt + Bt + Ξt − Tt. (21)
Aggregate lump-sum transfers, Ξt, are set so as to satisfy this equation, and









Given Ψt and Dt, the transfer Ξt can be derived from the period government
budget constraint (21).
122.6 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Having completed the description of the economy we can now deﬁne a recur-
sive competitive equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1: Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Given {At,δt,Ψt,Nt}∞
t=0, a recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of
household value functions {Vj(xj,t;Xt)}J
j=1 for all t, and associated policy
functions: {aj,t(xj,t;Xt),cj,t(xj,t;Xt),`j,t(xj,t;Xt)}J
j=1 for all t, factor prices
{w(Xt),r(Xt)}∞
t=0 and aggregate policy functions for capital Kt+1 = K(Xt)
and labor input Ht = H(Xt) such that:
• Given the functions of factor prices {w(Xt),R(Xt)} and the aggregate
policy functions for labor and capital the household policy functions
{aj,t(xj,t;Xt),cj,t(xj,t;Xt),`j,t(xj,t;Xt)} solve the household’s dynamic
program (11)-(15).
• The factor prices are competitively determined so that (5) and (6) hold,
and Rt = R(Xt) ≡ 1 + rt − δt and wt = w(Xt).
• The commodity market clears:
Yt = Ct + It + Gt
where Ct =
P
j cj,t(xj,t;Xt)Nj,t is aggregate consumption and It =
Kt+1 − (1 − δt)Kt is aggregate investment, and Gt is government pur-
chases.










13• The government budget constraint is satisﬁed in each period:
Dt+1 + Tt = R(Xt)Dt + Gt + Bt + Ξt
In our simulations we assume that the economy eventually approaches
a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium. Before deﬁning a stationary
recursive competitive equilibrium we ﬁrst deﬁne some of the building blocks.
Deﬁnition 2: Stationary population distribution
Suppose that the fertility rate and the conditional survival probabilities
are constant over time: n1,t = n1 for all t and ψj,t = ψj for all t and j.










   

(1 + n1) 0 0 ... 0
ψ1 0 0 ... 0
0 ψ2 0 ... 0
.........................
0 0 0 ψJ−1 0

   

A stationary population distribution has two desirable properties. First,





t for all t. Second, the aggregate population growth rate is time-
invariant: nt = N∗
t+1/N∗
t = n1 for all t. This allows us to convert the growth











Other per-capita variables in the household budget constraint are trans-
formed in same way. Aggregate variables in period t are transformed by
dividing by A
1/(1−α)
t Nt except for aggregate labor input, which is transformed
by dividing by Nt.
Deﬁnition 3: Stationary recursive competitive equilibrium
14Suppose the population distribution is stationary and the growth rate of
total factor productivity is constant over time: γt = γ∗ for all t. Then a
stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a recursive competitive equi-
librium that satisﬁes:
˜ cj,t = ˜ c
∗
j, ˜ aj,t = ˜ a
∗
j, ˜ `j,t = `
∗
j
for all t and j, i.e., the factor prices are constant over time: {rt, ˜ wt} =




This completes the description of the model.
3 Calibration
The model is calibrated to Japanese data. The values of the parameters and
sources of the exogenous variables are reported in Table 1. We assume that
each household has one adult member. New households are formed when
individuals reach the age of 21 and households die no later than the end of
the 100th year of life, i.e., J = 80.
We assume that the period utility function is logarithmic
u(cj,t,`j,t;ηj,t) = φ[ηj,t log(cj,t/ηj,t)] + (1 − φ)log(`j,t). (23)
The calibration of the other structural parameters is done in the following
way. We set the capital share parameter, α, to reproduce the average capital
share of output in Japanese data over the period 1984-2000. The preference
discount factor, β, is chosen so that the steady-state value of the after-tax
real interest rate equals is average value in Japanese data over the period
1984-2000. The preference parameter for leisure, φ, is chosen so that steady-
state hours per worker equals average weekly hours per worker in Japanese
data over the period 1984-2000.13
13Even though we have data extending back to 1960, the sample period used in calibrat-
ing the parameters is restricted to 1984-2000. The reason for this is that sample averages
of, e.g., the capital-output ratio are likely to be closer to their long-run averages when
data from the 1960s and 1970s are omitted. Under the maintained null hypothesis of our
model, data during this period are dominated by convergence to the steady-state from a
low initial capital stock.
15Dynamic simulations require values for the initial state of the economy
in 1961 and for the entire future time path of the exogenous elements of
the state vector. Hayashi, Ando and Ferris (1988) report asset holdings by
generation using data from 1983-1984. We use their data to determine the
asset shares of each cohort in 1961 and then re-scale to reproduce the value
of the aggregate Japanese capital stock in 1961.
The aggregate state vector Xt consists of total factor productivity, the
depreciation rate, the family scale, the age distribution of the population, the
asset holding of each cohort and the government policy variables. Total factor
productivity is calculated by the standard growth accounting method using
a calibrated capital share α and data on the capital stock and labor input
reported in Hayashi and Prescott (2002) for the period 1961 through 2000. In
our baseline model, we assume that TFP recovers linearly to a growth rate of
2 percent per annum between 2000 and 2010, and then grows thereafter at a
constant rate of 2 percent per year. We also report results below that examine
the robustness of our conclusions to this assumption. The depreciation rate
varies over time and is measured using data provided by Hayashi and Prescott
(2002) up through 2001. After 2001 the depreciation rate is assumed to
remain constant at its 2001 value of 0.076. Household’s labor eﬃciencies vary
with age but the eﬃciency proﬁle is assumed to be constant over time. The
labor eﬃciency proﬁle, εj, is constructed from Japanese data on employment,
wages, and weekly hours following the methodology described in Hansen
(1993).14
The net fertility rate, n1,t, is calibrated to data on the growth rate of
21-year-olds for the period 1961-2000, and the series is extended to 2050
using projections of the National Institute of Population and Social Security
Research (IPSS). After 2050 we assume that the growth rate of 21-year olds
recovers over a 15 year period to zero and is then constant at zero thereafter.
Conditional survival probabilities, ψj,t, are based on life tables produced by
IPSS through 2050. After 2050 the survival probabilities are held ﬁxed at
their 2050 levels.15 These assumptions about fertility and survival rates in
conjunction with an initial age-population distribution are used to produce
14See the data appendix in Braun, et al. (2005) for more details.
15More details on the construction of these variables is found in the Appendix.
16an age distribution of the population at each date using equations (1)-(3).
Figure 1 shows the implications of our baseline demographic assumptions
for the time path of fractions of diﬀerent age groups in total population.
The ﬁgure also displays the actual cohort shares and the oﬃcial IPSS open-
economy projections. These are quite close to the model predicted series
which abstract from immigration and emigration ﬂows. Our demographic
assumptions imply that the Japanese population will fall by about 50 percent
over the next 100 years.
We allow family scale to vary over time. Our calibration requires sev-
eral simplifying assumptions about how families evolve over time. A key
assumption is that the number of children born to a household of age j in
period t is given by mj,t = ftmj, where mj is a time-invariant indicator of
the relative number of births occurring in each year of the parent’s life cycle
and ft is a time-varying shock to aggregate fertility. The time series of ft
together with the mj determine the number of children in a household of a
given age at each date. We calibrate ft and mj from cross-sectional data on
the number of children in households of diﬀerent ages in 2000 and the time
series of 21-year-olds, Nj,t.
Government purchases, the labor income tax rate, and the capital income
tax rate are taken from data provided by Hayashi and Prescott (2002) for
the 1961-2001 period and after that the tax rates are held ﬁxed at their 2001
levels. The capital income tax rate is measured as the tax on capital income
divided by capital income, and the wage income tax rate is measured as the
sum of direct tax on households and the social security tax payments divided
by wage income.
Our baseline speciﬁcation assumes that the amount of government debt
is ﬁxed at zero. In Section 5.4 we will extend the baseline model to allow
for time-variation in government debt. This extension only has a negligible
eﬀect on the model’s implications for the national saving rate so we omit
government debt from our baseline model.
All variants of the model assume public pension beneﬁts to be equal to
17 percent of average earnings in working periods up through 1976 and 40
percent thereafter following Oshio and Yashiro (1998). Chen, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu,
and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2005) make this same assumption in their overlapping
17generations model.
4 Assessing the Model’s Performance Using
Historical Data
In this section, we use our model to simulate the Japanese saving rate from
1961 to 2000. Our ultimate objective is to use our model to make projections
about the future course of the saving rate. However, before doing that we
ﬁrst demonstrate that we have a good model by documenting its in-sample
performance.
The Japanese national saving rate and after-tax real interest rate have
exhibited substantial variation during the decades following 1960. The saving
rate peaks in excess of 25 percent in the late 1960s, then ﬂuctuates between
10 and 15 percent from the early 1970s until 1990, and ﬁnally falls to about 5
percent during the 1990s. The after-tax real return on capital varies between
12 and 21 percent between 1961 and 1973. From the mid-1970s to 1990 it
ranges between 5 and 6 percent and then falls below 4 percent in the 1990s.
To what extent are the large historical variations in Japanese saving rates
a puzzle for economic theory? Christiano (1989) investigates whether recov-
ery from the destruction of World War II can account for these movements.
He posits a low initial capital stock in a neoclassical growth model and ﬁnds
that the large observed swings in the Japanese saving rate are a puzzle for
standard economic theory. Chen, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2005) re-
visit this same question and ﬁnd that a model similar to the one used here,
but with constant birth and death rates over time and exogenous labor, can
account for much of the variation in the Japanese saving rate in historical
data. The major reason for their success is that they allow TFP growth to
vary over time.
More recently, Chen, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2006b) incorporate
time-varying birth and death rates into their model, as in the analysis re-
ported here. The model continues to perform well in accounting for historical
saving behavior. However, allowing for demographic variation results in little
increase in explanatory power as compared to a speciﬁcation with only time-
18varying TFP growth. This conclusion contrasts with our ﬁndings in Braun,
Ikeda and Joines (2005). We compare steady states and conduct a dynamic
analysis calibrated to Japanese data from 1990 and 2000 and ﬁnd that demo-
graphics and TFP growth are roughly equally important in accounting for
the observed declines in saving and interest rates in the 1990s.
Our model diﬀers from the computable overlapping generations models
of Chen, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2005, 2006b) in several respects.
Our households have an endogenous labor supply decision.16 Allowing for a
labor supply decision provides another way for households to smooth con-
sumption and thus can aﬀect households’ saving decisions. We also allow
the size of families to vary over time in a way that is consistent with the
number of under-21-year-olds in the Japanese economy in any given year.
Time variation in family scale aﬀects consumption-saving decisions. With
these extensions our model does a reasonably good job of accounting for the
observed variation in Japanese saving. The model also reproduces some of
the principal movements in the after-tax real interest rate, output, and hours
per worker.
Figure 2 displays our baseline results for the period 1961-2001. The ﬁg-
ure has four panels that show the behavior of the national saving rate, the
after-tax real interest rate, hours per worker and the growth rate of GNP.17
The data are all taken from Hayashi and Prescott (2002). For purposes of
comparison we also report simulation results from Chen, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2006a). They consider an inﬁnite horizon model with a labor
supply decision that allows for exogenous time-variation in the depreciation
rate, the tax rate on capital, exogenous government purchases, TFP and
population growth. Their simulation results are labeled CII in the panels of
Figure 2.
The baseline model tracks the observed saving rate reasonably well. It
reproduces the 1961 value of the saving rate in Japanese data. The empirical
16Chen, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2006a) and Braun, Okada and Sudou (2006)
apply inﬁnite-horizon, representative-agent models with ﬂexible labor supply to Japanese
data.
17The national saving rate is deﬁned as the ratio of Net National Product minus private
consumption minus government consumption to NNP. The after-tax real interest rate is
the after-tax real return on capital.
19saving rate reaches its maximum value of 27 percent in 1970. The simulated
series reaches its maximum of 25 percent in the same year. From 1970 to 1991
the model understates the level of the Japanese saving rate with a maximum
gap of 5.5 percent in 1983. But the gap between the model and the data
falls in 1990s. The observed series declines from 14.9 percent in 1990 to 5.7
percent in 2000, while the simulated series declines from 13.7 percent to 6.9
percent.
Our data set, which is based on the 1968 system of national accounts
(SNA), stops in 2000.18 We compare the model’s predictions with more re-
cent saving data using national saving from the new 1993 system of national
accounts. This series is not directly comparable to the Hayashi-Prescott se-
ries. While the two measures of saving diﬀer in level, they exhibit similar
declines during the 1990s. In this sense, both empirical measures are quali-
tatively consistent with the decline in saving predicted by the model for that
period. In addition, the measure of the national saving rate based on 1993
SNA data continues to decline between 2000 and 2004, as does the model’s
predicted saving rate.
Our model also performs well when compared with the CII model. Their
model performs better between 1995 to 2000 and worse between 1975 and
1990 and between 2000 and 2002. Expectations about future TFP growth
play an important role in the relatively good performance of their model
between 1995 and 2000 and the unusual movements in the CII saving rate
after 2000. They assume that TFP growth recovers to 3.15 percent in 2001
and is constant at this value thereafter. This assumption acts to depress
the saving rate from 1995-2000 and induces a sharp recovery in the saving
rate after 2000. In their baseline model the saving rate falls from 14 percent
in 1990 to 5 percent in 2000. If instead TFP growth is assumed to recover
according to a linear rule to a 2 percent growth rate over a 10 year period,
as we assume, the decline in the saving rate in their model is much smaller.
It declines from 14 percent in 1990 to 9 percent in 2000.
The CII model also allows the population growth rate to vary over time.
181968 SNA data are not reported by the Japanese government after 2001. Our data
also use a replacement cost measure of depreciation constructed by Hayashi and Prescott
(2002), which is available only through 2000.
20It falls from 1.3 percent in 1990 to 0 percent in 2000 in their dataset. In future
years they assume that the population growth rate jumps to 1.2 percent in
2001 and is unchanged at this value thereafter. If instead the population
growth rate is assumed to be zero in future years and TFP growth follows
our conditioning assumptions then the saving rate in the CII model falls from
14 percent in 1990 to 7 percent in 2000 which is about the same magnitude of
decline in the saving rate produced by our model. Observe also that the gap
between the 2000 value of the saving rate in this simulation and the previous
simulation which only alters the assumption about productivity growth is 2
percentage points. We will provide evidence in Section 5.1 that the overall
contribution of demographic change to the decline in the saving rate in our
model ranges from 2 to 3 percentage points during the 1990s. The role of
expectations is also discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.
We use the root-mean-squared error criterion to measure overall ﬁt of the
simulated saving rate in our baseline model and the CII model. Our baseline
model produces a root-mean-squared error of 2.9 percent and the CII model
produces a root-mean-squared error of 3.8 percent over the 1961-2000 sample
period.
The baseline model also does reasonably well in reproducing the after-tax
real interest rate. The gap between the model and data is largest between
1966 and 1976. The model reproduces the general year-to-year movements
in the data during this period but understates the high real return to capital.
The baseline model does much better from 1976 to 2000. During that period
the gap between the model and the data is always less than 60 basis points.
The model predicts a decline of 130 basis points during the 1990s, which is
80 basis points smaller than the observed decline of 210 basis points. Our
baseline model also compares favorably with the CII model. That model
overstates the real interest rate for most periods after 1975. The root-mean-
squared error for our baseline model is 2.1 percent as compared to 2.8 percent
for the CII model.
Interestingly, the baseline model also reproduces the secular decline in
Japanese average hours per worker between 1961 and 1990.19 Empirical
19The model expresses hours worked as a share. When converting this share to a measure
of weekly hours we assume a weekly time endowment of 112 hours (16 hours per day).
21weekly hours per worker decrease from 50.3 to 43.5 during that period, while
the simulated series decreases from 49.6 to 41.4 hours per week. The match
is particularly good prior to 1976. Modeling variations in family scale helps
match the trend in the data. Over the 1961-2000 sample period family scale
has fallen substantially, and this acts to increase households’ demand for
leisure relative to consumption goods. The CII model, does a better job
of matching hours in the 1980s but fails to reproduce the magnitude of the
secular decline in hours. This produces a higher root-mean squared error of
2.39 percent as compared to 1.9 percent for the baseline model.
One puzzling feature of these results is that weekly hours per worker in the
model decline from 43.4 in 1979 to 39.9 in 1983, whereas Japanese hours per
worker remained above 43 hours per week through 1989. We have explored
the source of this discrepancy and found that the reason model hours fall is a
rising tax rate on labor income. Between 1961 and 1978 the labor income tax
increased at an annualized rate of 0.47 percentage points per year. In the
next 3 years it jumped by 4.5 percentage points and then rose by another
percentage point in the next 2 years. After that the growth rate of the
labor income tax rate slowed to 0.28 percent per annum on average. When
we simulate the model with a constant labor income tax rate the model no
longer predicts a decline in hours between 1979 and 1983. The CII model,
in contrast, assumes a zero tax on labor in all periods.
The predictions of the baseline model for per capita output growth are
also quite good. The model reproduces both the amplitude and timing of
movements in the growth rate of Japanese output. Here the CII model
performs a bit better producing a root-mean-squared error of 1.4 percent as
compared to 1.6 percent for the baseline model. The reason for this diﬀerence
is that the CII model performs noticeably better in the early 1960s. One
reason for this diﬀerence may be due to the fact that we have to specify an
initial population-wealth distribution in 1960. Lacking direct observations on
this distribution in 1960 we extrapolated backwards using data from 1983-
1984 as described in Section 3. We have found that the eﬀect of the choice
of the initial age-wealth distribution quickly dies out. However, this choice
can aﬀect the evolution of capital in the ﬁrst four or ﬁve years. If we instead
calculate the root-mean-squared error for output for the sample-period 1970-
222000 the root-mean-squared is 1.3 percent for both models.
Overall, the performance of our life-cycle model reasonably well. In par-
ticular its performance is better, in most dimensions than one leading repre-
sentative agent model that abstracts from life-cycle eﬀects.
We also considered several variants of our baseline speciﬁcation. We var-
ied the degree of risk aversion, ﬁxed the depreciation rate on capital, and
explored the role of social security. The properties of the model with higher
risk aversion are reported in Section 5.4 below. Fixing the depreciation rate
doesn’t aﬀect the model’s implications for the saving rate after 1970 but does
cause the model to overstate saving throughout most of the 1960s. Depreci-
ation rates are large prior to 1970. If the depreciation rate is assumed ﬁxed,
the predicted saving rate through 1968 is as high on average as the values
observed from 1969 through the early 1970s. Finally, alternative scenarios
for social security had only small eﬀects on the results. For instance, if social
security is assumed not to exist, the maximum diﬀerence between the sim-
ulated saving rate and that in the baseline speciﬁcation is 0.65 percent and
this occurs in 1961.20
5 Projections
5.1 Baseline Projections
The success of our model in reproducing much of the year-to-year pattern of
saving rates as well as the long-term decline in interest rates suggests that
we have a good theory of the Japanese national saving rate. We now use
this same theory to project the future course of the national saving rate.
Figure 3 displays baseline projections and two other sets of projections that
are designed to isolate the role of demographics and TFP. Recall that our
baseline conditioning assumptions rely on projections from IPSS for the net
fertility rates and mortality rates through 2050. The annual growth rate of
TFP is assumed to recover gradually to two percent between 2000 and 2010.
20Both the depreciation rate and the scale of social security are assumed to be ﬁxed
beyond the year 2000 in our baseline model. Consequently, holding them ﬁxed from 1961
to 2000 has no material eﬀect on the model’s projections for future years.
23These assumptions are discussed in more detail in the calibration section
above.
The single most important fact about Japanese saving in the post-World
War II period has been its magnitude. As recently as 1990 the saving rate
was 15 percent in Japan, or about three times as large as in the United
States. Our baseline results indicate that in future years the trend level of
the Japanese saving rate will not exceed 5.2 percent. Saving rates fall to a
low of −0.2 percent in 2009 and eventually rise to a new steady-state value
of 5.1 percent by the year 2140. This pattern is not monotonic, however.
The saving rate increases to 3.0 percent in 2025 as a result of the echo of
the baby boom. It then falls again to 1.7 percent in 2045 before increasing
gradually to the new steady state.
One way to identify the distinct roles of demographics and TFP for the
aggregate saving rate is to run counterfactual simulations. Figure 3 reports
results from two such simulations. The 1980s no change simulation, holds
the net fertility rate from 1990 on ﬁxed at 1 percent, which is close to the
average growth rate of 21-year-olds during the 1980s. In addition, the mor-
tality rates are held ﬁxed at their 1990 levels. TFP growth from 1990 on is
set to 3.1 percent, which is the average value of TFP growth in Japanese data
during the 1980s. This set of assumptions is meant to illustrate what might
have happened if the demographic and TFP growth patterns of the 1980s
had persisted forever. The second counterfactual simulation, 1980s popula-
tion, diﬀers from the ﬁrst in assuming that TFP growth follows our baseline
conditioning assumptions and only the fertility rate and the mortality rates
are held at levels representative of the 1980s.
Consider the 1980s no change simulation. The most striking thing about
this simulation is that the variation in the saving rate during and after the
1990s is very small. Observe next that even though the population growth
and mortality rates are ﬁxed at their 1980s levels, the saving rate does de-
cline until 2014 to a low of 7.3 percent. This is due to the aging of the
baby-boom generation. The new long-run steady-state value is 8.7 percent.
Next compare the 1980s no change simulation with the 1980s population
simulation, which shows a large drop in the saving rate in the early part of
the twenty-ﬁrst century. From this we can see that low TFP growth between
241990 and 2010 plays the dominant role in the evolution of the baseline saving
rate through about 2012. By 2012, though, demographics account for one
half of the gap between the baseline and 1980s no change simulation. The
contribution of demographics to the gap then rises to 70 percent in 2031 and
remains between 70 and 80 percent until 2107. In the ﬁnal steady state,
demographics account for 56 percent of the total gap between the baseline
simulation and the 1980s no change simulation.
Taken together these results suggest that demographic variation will exert
considerable inﬂuence on the Japanese saving rate in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
Figure 3 also reports projections for the after-tax real interest rate. There
are some striking diﬀerences among the three projections. The baseline re-
sults presented in the lower panel of Figure 3 suggest that after-tax real
interest rates have bottomed out and will gradually recover to levels expe-
rienced by Japan between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s. After reaching
a minimum value of 4.0 percent in 2006, the after-tax real interest rate rises
to 5 percent by 2025 and to 5.1 percent in 2055 before settling at its ﬁnal
steady-state value of 5.2 percent. Comparing the two counterfactual sim-
ulations, we see that TFP plays a more signiﬁcant role than demographics
in after-tax real interest rate projections. The 1980s no change simulation
is particularly interesting. This speciﬁcation has the after-tax interest rate
rising during the 1990s. We will return to discuss this ﬁnal point in more
detail in Section 5.3.
The rich demographic structure of our model provides us with a way to
understand what changes in the microeconomic structure of this economy
are driving variations in the aggregate saving rate. The national saving rate






The net national saving rate in turn can be decomposed into a weighted sum






















































and where sj,t is the individual saving rate, aj,t is the asset holding of an
individual of age j at the end of time t, Nj,t is the population of age j at
time t, and ψj,t is the age-j survival probability at time t.21 The weight χj,t,
is simply the share of net national income accruing to households of age j.
Let µj,t ≡ Nj,t/Nt denote cohort j’s share in total population in period
t. Then using equation (25) we can express the change in the net national
saving rate from t − k to t as the sum of three components
21Note that sj,t, the individual saving rate, corresponds to a situation where the gov-
ernment gathers accidental bequests and redistributes them in a lump-sum way equally
among all surviving individuals. An individual’s saving during period t is deﬁned as assets
held at the end of the period, aj,t, less initial assets. Initial assets are the sum of assets
held by the individual at the end of the previous period, aj−1,t−1, and qt, the individ-
ual’s share of the assets held at the end of period t − 1 by individuals who die before the
beginning of period t.
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sj,tµj,t(zj,t − zj,t−k) (26)
where zj,t =
yj,t
(Yt−δtKt)/Nt is the per capita income of individuals of age j rel-
ative to overall per capita income in the economy. We will refer to the ﬁrst,
second, and third terms in equation (26) as respectively the saving rate com-
ponent, the cohort size component and the relative income component. The
cohort size component is a weighted average of changes in the relative size
of each cohort, and the relative income component is a weighted average of
changes in the income of an age-j household relative to overall per capita
income. The saving rate component is a weighted average of changes in
individual saving rates. It summarizes the endogenous response of household
saving rates to variations in preferences and budget constraints.22 Prefer-
ences can change from one cohort to the next because of changes over time
in survival probabilities and family scale (see equations 8 and 23). Budget
constraints depend on tax rates, transfers, and factor prices. Factor prices
in turn respond to a variety of shocks, including technology, demographics,
and ﬁscal policy. Thus, demographic change aﬀects the saving rate directly
through the cohort size component and indirectly through the other two com-
ponents. In principle, these indirect eﬀects can either reinforce or attenuate
the direct eﬀect due to changes in cohort size.
Figure 4 reports two plots of this decomposition of the national saving
rate using data from the baseline simulation. The upper panel shows decade
changes of the national saving rate for the period 1961-2000. The lower panel
shows diﬀerences over successively longer horizons starting from a base year of
1990. Consider ﬁrst the upper panel. According to the model the saving rate
component has been the primary source of historical decade-level variations
in the national saving rate. It is the largest component in all but one decade
22It should be kept in mind that the saving rate at each age depends on the entire
lifetime budget constraint rather than the single-period constraint for the current period.
27(1961-1970), when changes in the relative income component are largest. The
cohort size component is small in historical data. Chen, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2006a, 2006b) ﬁnd that modeling demographics is not impor-
tant for understanding the evolution of the saving rate over a similar sample
period. The upper panel of Figure 4 suggests that their ﬁnding may stem
from the fact that cohort size movements were relatively small during this
period.23
Are cohort eﬀects always small and in particular smaller than saving rate
eﬀects? Results reported in the lower panel of Figure 4 suggest that the
answer is no. The size of the cohort eﬀect steadily increases as the forecast
horizon is expanded. Through 2030 the saving rate component is the largest
source of variation in the national saving rate. But after that the cohort size
component is always larger. By 2100 the cohort size component is 2.5 times
as large as the saving rate component.
Decomposing the saving rate into these three components oﬀers some
insight into one role of demographics but does not tell the whole story. This
is because the saving rate and relative income components are themselves
aﬀected by demographics, as well as by TFP and other relevant exogenous
shocks including ﬁscal policy. The cohort size component, on the other hand,
is aﬀected only by demographic change and thus measures only the direct
eﬀects of such change on saving rates.
By way of illustration, the cohort size eﬀect in Figure 4 indicates that
demographic change directly reduced the saving rate by 2.1 percentage points
between 1990 and 2000. We can gauge the total eﬀect of demographics,
both direct and indirect, by simulating our model under the assumption that
only demographics changed after 1990, with TFP growth, ﬁscal policy, and
other variables held ﬁxed at their 1990 values. This “demographics only”
simulation is the polar opposite of the previous section’s 1980s population
simulation, which held demographics ﬁxed at levels representative of 1990
and allowed all other exogenous inputs to vary. The demographics only
simulation produces a decline in the saving rate of 3.1 percentage points
23Although not reported here due to space constraints, the saving rate component can
be further decomposed by age. Doing so reveals that saving rates change in the same
direction for almost all age groups during a given decade.
28between 1990 and 2000. Thus, the indirect eﬀects of demographic change
during the 1990s reinforce the direct eﬀects and are about half as large as
the direct eﬀects.
The information in Figure 4 reinforces the conclusion from Figure 3 that
TFP shocks are the primary determinant of variations in the saving rate
in historical Japanese data. But both ﬁgures also imply that demographic
change will be the dominant factor in explaining a long-run decline in trend
saving rates from the levels seen in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
5.2 Implications of Changing Demographics for Other
Macroeconomic Variables
So far, we have concentrated on the implications of changing demographics
for the future evolution of the national saving rate and the after-tax real
interest rate. Longer life expectancies and lower fertility rates also have im-
plications for other macroeconomic variables. We now brieﬂy discuss these
implications. To isolate the contribution of demographic factors for these
other variables we would like to understand what would have happened to
consumption and other macroeconomic variables if the factors that determine
the population distribution do not change. We do this by exmining the be-
havior of these variables in the 1980s population simulation discussed above.
In this simulation the two factors that determine the population growth rate
− the fertility rate, n1,t, and the survival probabilities, ψj,t, − are both held
ﬁxed at their 1990 values. TFP is assumed to follow its baseline trajectory.
It should be emphasized at the outset that the current population distribu-
tion is a complicated distributed lag of previous fertility and survival rates
(see equation (1)) and that these conditioning assumptions are not suﬃcient
to freeze the population distribution in 1990. This counterfactual simulation
does not, for instance, control for the aging of the baby-boom cohorts. These
conditioning assumptions do, however, substantially reduce the overall vari-
ation in the population distribution in future years. The results from this
counterfactual simulation are reported in Table 2. Results are reported as
percentage deviations from the baseline forecast for a variety of forecast hori-
zons. A positive sign implies that a particular variable is above its baseline
29value in that particular year. All variables are expressed in per capita terms.
Fixing the fertility rate and the survival probabilities has important im-
plications for both the situation of the economy in 1990 and its evolution
after 1990. Per capita output is depressed by 2 percent in 1990. Capital and
labor input are depressed 3.82 and 1.14 percent. The capital stock is lower
because there is less need to save for retirement since life expectancies will
remain short in future years. A shorter average life expectancy also leads
households to enjoy more leisure during their working years and labor input
falls relative to the baseline.
The response of most variables is not monotonic in the forecast horizon.
At shorter forecast horizons, abstracting from changing fertility and survival
rates acts to depress output, consumption and the capital stock. In 2010, the
per capita capital stock is 9 percent lower than its baseline value. Output
is 4 percent lower and consumption is 3.5 percent lower than their baseline
values. These responses are due primarily to the aging of baby-boom cohorts
who now have relatively short retirement periods. At longer forecast horizons
continued high fertility rates act to raise per capita labor input by lowering
the fraction of retirees to workers. This raises per capita consumption, output
and the capital stock. By 2050 per capita output is 12.55 percent above its
baseline value, labor is 20 percent above its baseline value and consumption
is 7.6 percent above its baseline value.
5.3 Projections using Alternative Conditioning Assump-
tions
How sensitive are the model’s projections to our conditioning assumptions
about total factor productivity and demographics? In order to answer this
question we report four other simulations in Figure 5. Two of these variants
maintain our baseline assumptions for TFP growth but use either the high
or low IPSS population projections rather than the intermediate projections
which we use in our baseline model. The intermediate population projection
implies that the Japanese population in 2050 will be 105.2 million and that
36 percent of the population will be of age 65 or above. The high population
projection is 108.2 million with 33 percent of the population aged 65 and
30above, and the low projection yields an estimate of 92 million with 39 per-
cent of the total aged 65 and above. Thus, the diﬀerences in aging implied by
the alternative population projections are rather modest when compared to
the large overall increase in aging that occurs between 1990 and 2050. The
third and fourth variants retain the baseline population projections but make
alternative assumptions about the TFP growth rate. The low TFP simula-
tion assumes that productivity growth does not recover and instead remains
at 0.33 percent per year, its average value for the 1990s. This assumption of
permanently low total factor productivity growth is maintained by Hayashi
and Prescott (2002). The high TFP simulation assumes that TFP growth
recovers to 3.1 percent per annum, its average value during the 1980s.
Consider ﬁrst the results for alternative demographic assumptions. These
assumptions have no discernible eﬀect on the saving rate either in the very
long run, by which point they all yield the same age structure of the popu-
lation, or up until the local peak associated with the echo of the baby boom
around 2025. Over intermediate forecast horizons, however, demographics
exert a noticeable inﬂuence on saving. The saving rate under the high popu-
lation assumption is uniformly above the baseline projection, and the decline
after the local peak in 2029 is muted. The corresponding decline under the
low population assumption is quite pronounced, with the saving rate falling
to zero between 2060 and 2068. The eﬀect of these alternative demographic
assumptions on saving rates is nevertheless much smaller than the decline
in saving compared with 1990. This is because the alternative population
projections all result in age distributions of the population that are similar
to each other, while the 1990 age distribution is quite diﬀerent. As noted
above, the elderly (aged 65 and above) are projected to constitute between
33 and 39 percent of the population in 2050, compared to 12 percent in 1990.
Varying the demographic assumptions has smaller eﬀects on interest rates.
The low (high) population assumption results in interest rates that are below
(above) those predicted by the baseline model during much of the transition
to the new steady-state. The diﬀerences from the baseline projection are
largest during the years 2035-2086, when they range between ﬁve and twenty
basis points.
The results would look very diﬀerent if the low growth rate of TFP of the
311990s is assumed to be permanent while the demographic variables are set to
their baseline values. Consider ﬁrst the net saving rate. It remains negative
into the next century and eventually approaches a new long-run value below
one percent, as compared to 5.1 percent in the baseline speciﬁcation. How-
ever, the saving rate with low TFP growth is above the baseline case for the
years 2001-2013. This is because an anticipated recovery of TFP depresses
saving in the short term.
We see similar patterns in the real interest rate. There are two distinctions
between the low TFP simulation and the baseline. The real interest rate does
not increase after 2007 as it does under the baseline parameterization of a
recovery of total factor productivity growth. Instead, the real interest rate
stays in the neighborhood of 3.5 percent between 2001 and 2052. In addition,
the new steady-state interest rate is only 3.9 percent, versus 5.2 percent in
the baseline case.
Finally, consider the high TFP simulation which uses actual data on
TFP and demographics during the 1990s but posits a stronger recovery of
TFP growth to 3.1 percent per annum between 2001 and 2010. Recall from
Section 5.2 that TFP grew at an average rate of 3.1 percent during the 1980s.
There are three noteworthy features about the saving rate in this simulation.
First, the model predicts a permanent decline in the saving rate from 13.6
percent in 1990 to 7 percent in the ﬁnal steady-state. Second, the saving
rate remains at or below 5 percent through the year 2093. Third, the model
ﬁt with the data is good during the 1990s. We saw above that the 1980s
no change simulation fails to account for the saving rate in the early 1990s.
Comparing these two simulations which have identical assumptions for the
long-run growth rate of TFP suggests that expectations about what happens
to TFP growth during the 1990s really matters.
The role of expectations appears to be even more pronounced for the real
interest rate. The real interest rate increases during the 1990s in the 1980s
no change simulation reported in Figure 3 . However, in the high TFP sim-
ulation which feeds through actual TFP growth and demographic changes,
the real interest rate falls throughout the 1990s as in the data. However,
these simulations are only suggestive and could simply reﬂect diﬀerences in
the contemporaneous responses of the economy to variations in TFP. A bet-
32ter way to isolate the eﬀect of expectations is to see how future changes in
TFP growth aﬀect economic activity today.
To pursue this point further we performed a counterfactual simulation. In
this simulation TFP is assumed to grow (and to be expected to grow) at its
1990s average value of 3.1% from 1990 on. If expectations matter then this
should show up in the model’s performance before 1990. When we compare
this counterfactual simulation to the baseline simulation we ﬁnd that there
are only tiny diﬀerences between the saving rate in the two models before
1985. However, from 1985 on there are discernible and growing diﬀerences.
By 1988 the gap in the saving rate between the two models is 2.6 percentage
points. Chen, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2006a), report a similar ﬁnding
when they consider a variant of their model in which households use no-
change forecasting rules. That model reproduces decade-level swings in the
saving rate but produces only a moderate rise in the saving rate in the late
1980s. Taken together these results suggest that an expectation of slow
growth after 1990 is important for producing a large increase in the national
saving rate in Japan in the last half of the 1980s.
To summarize, we ﬁnd that both changing demographics and lower pro-
ductivity growth contribute to reproducing the observed decline in the inter-
est rate from 6 percent in 1990 to 3.9 percent by the year 2000. Our results
also indicate that observed and projected changes in fertility rates produce
very persistent responses in the saving rate, but much smaller responses in
the after-tax real interest rate. Sustained but temporary shocks to total
factor productivity growth have large contemporaneous eﬀects and expected
changes in TFP also matter but do not produce much propagation over time
in the model. These simulations add further support to our contention that
the average value of saving rates in future years will be low relative to levels
experienced in Japan before 1990. The saving rate remains low through the
end of the century even under the most optimistic assumptions about TFP
growth and demographics.
335.4 Government Debt
Here we consider the robustness of our conclusions to our maintained as-
sumption that government debt is zero. In an inﬁnite-horizon model this
assumption is innocuous when lump-sum transfers are present and free to
adjust. However, in an overlapping generations model the timing of govern-
ment borrowing and lump-sum transfers may beneﬁt particular generations.
To explore this issue we conducted a simulation in which we used data on
government borrowing. Following Broda and Weinstein (2004) we calculated
the net government debt using data from the Bank of Japan Flow of Funds
website for 1979-2004 and from government sources for 1961-1978. Net gov-
ernment debt constructed in this way varies from about 2 percent of GDP in
the 1960s to 72.7 percent in 2004. The debt-output ratio is assumed to be
ﬁxed at its 2004 level in future years. Lump-sum transfers are adjusted each
period to insure that the government budget constraint is satisﬁed. Even
though the net government debt in 2004 is more than 10 times as large as
that in 1990, the results from generalizing the model in this way are imper-
ceptibly diﬀerent from the baseline speciﬁcation. The maximum diﬀerence
between the baseline saving rate and the speciﬁcation with government debt
is 0.35 percent and this occurs in 1962.
It is, of course, possible that the Japanese economy is less nearly Ri-
cardian than our model. If this is the case, we might expect the model
to perform noticeably less well in explaining saving during the 1990s than
during earlier decades, since government budget deﬁcits constituted a sub-
stantially larger fraction of GDP during the 1990s. As Figure 2(a) shows,
however, the model’s predictions about the level of the saving rate are no
worse for the 1990s than for earlier decades. The model understates the
decline in the saving rate during the 1990s by about 2.5 percentage points.
The baseline version without government debt implies a drop in the national
saving rate from 13.7 percent in 1990 to 6.9 percent in 2000, a decline of 6.8
percentage points. The baseline model augmented to include an exogenous
debt series taken from Japanese data predicts that the saving rate drops from
13.6 percent in 1990 to 6.7 percent in 2000. The empirical analogue taken
from Hayashi and Prescott (2002) shows a decline of 9.3 percentage points,
from 14.9 percent in 1990 to 5.7 percent in 2000.
34If the Japanese economy is indeed very non-Ricardian, our model would
tend to overstate the change in the saving rate during periods of increas-
ing government budget deﬁcits, as during the 1990s, and to understate the
change in saving during periods of decreasing deﬁcits. But it is unclear
that increasing government budget deﬁcits are the major factor leading to
the model’s failure to fully account for the decline in the national saving
rate in the 1990s. The discrepancy between actual and predicted changes
in the saving rate for the 1990s is not abnormally large compared with the
prediction errors for other periods. For example, the model understates the
increase in the saving rate from a trough in 1965 to a peak in 1970 (a pe-
riod of roughly balanced budgets) by almost 4 percentage points. It also
overstates the increase from a trough in 1983 to 1990 by almost 2 percent-
age points. Because the budget moved from an average deﬁcit equal to
4.5 percent of GDP during 1981-85 to an average surplus of 2.6 percent of
GDP during the remainder of the decade, the model could be expected to
understate rather than overstate the change in the saving rate if it omitted
important non-Ricardian features present in the Japanese economy. These
episodes suggest that the model’s prediction errors are likely due to factors
other than variation in the government budget deﬁcit.
Another possible explanation for our ﬁnding that modeling government
debt doesn’t aﬀect the national saving rate in the 1990s is that our assump-
tion of a constant debt-GDP ratio after 2000 understates the eﬀects of deﬁcit
ﬁnance on the lifetime budget constraints of households alive in the 1990s.
To explore this possibility we conducted other simulations in which the gov-
ernment debt is assumed to increase to alternatively 100 percent, 125 percent
or 150 percent of output by 2060. These alternative simulations do show evi-
dence of some non-neutralities: the real interest rate in the ﬁnal steady-state
increases with the ﬁnal steady-state debt-GDP ratio. But the eﬀects are
quantitatively small. In the long run (by the year 2200), the reduction in the
capital stock is less than 7 percent of the increase in the public debt.24 The
long-run decrease in the capital stock is so small that it implies an almost
24This measure of crowding out is almost identical to that found by Joines (2006) in a
model calibrated to U.S. data and with a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption.
35imperceptible change in the net saving rate in any year along the transition
path. The real interest rate in the terminal steady state with a debt-GDP
ratio of 1.5 is 5.6 percent, as compared to 5.2 percent for our baseline model
with no government debt, and the maximum diﬀerence in the national saving
rate across the two simulations is 0.2 percent.
We also tried an experiment designed to capture what might have hap-
pened if all of the public debt accumulated during the 1990s had been rolled
over for many years. Permanently rolling over the debt is not sustainable.
However, we were able to successfully simulate a version of the model in
which the debt-output ratio grows at the rate of 5 percent per year until
2038 and then is held constant after 2038. In this simulation the ratio of
lump-sum transfers to output is 12 percent 1990. Between 1990 and 2038
lump-sum transfers average 12 percent but show some variation over time,
having a standard deviation of 1.9 percent. Their terminal value in 2038 is
also 12 percent. The resulting debt-output ratio is 416 percent in 2038. This
simulation exhibits somewhat larger evidence of non-neutralities. As in the
previous simulations a higher debt ratio depresses capital accumulation, the
capital output ratio is now 1.9 as compared to 2.2 in the baseline simulation.
This raises the terminal steady-state interest rate to 6.3 percent. In addi-
tion there is now a discernible response in other variables at longer horizons.
Labor input for instance is 6 percent higher in the steady-state with a 416
percent debt-GNP ratio. The biggest diﬀerence before 2038 is 1.8 percent
and occurs in 2038. The response of the national saving rate is still small.
The maximum diﬀerence compared to the baseline simulation occurs in 2037
and is 0.8 percent.
Generating a larger model response of the national saving rate to the
government budget deﬁcit would require more fundamental changes to the
model. Such modiﬁcations might include borrowing constraints, idiosyn-
cratic household income shocks, or adjusting distortionary taxes or rather
than lump-sum taxes and transfers to balance the government budget con-
straint.25
25Joines (2006) ﬁnds that borrowing constraints alone do not make a similar model
substantially more non-Ricardian. Moreover, an earlier version of our model included
borrowing constraints, but they were non-binding during most of the life cycle. Large,
uninsured, persistent shocks to the income process might cause borrowing constraints to
365.5 Lower Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
Our calibration assumes that the value of the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution (EIS) is one. Our choice is supported with Lucas (1990) who argues
that a value of the EIS exceeds 0.5 because values below this level imply im-
plausible interest rate diﬀerentials in countries that exhibit small diﬀerences
in consumption growth. Attanasio (1999) concludes that the value of the
EIS is close to one in both the United States and the United Kingdom and
Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999) conclude that when this parameter
is assumed to be constant across households it is hard to reject a value that
is close to 1. Hall (1988), in contrast, argues that the small response of ag-
gregate consumption growth to large swings in interest rates implies that the
value of the EIS is unlikely to exceed 0.1. Subsequent work by Ogaki and
Reinhart (1998) and Basu and Kimball (2000) that relaxes some of Hall’s
maintained separability assumptions estimate the EIS to be about 0.35.
Given that the appropriate setting of this parameter is the subject of
debate, we explore the robustness of our conclusions to our assumption by
simulating our model using CRRA preferences with an EIS of 0.25.26 The
two models generate almost identical long-run predictions, with the implied
saving rates diﬀering by less than 0.35 percentage points from 2069 onward.
The model with the low EIS results in a higher predicted saving rate from
1974 until 2016 and a lower saving rate thereafter. The baseline model
predicts that the saving rate reaches a minimum of −0.1 percent in 2009. The
alternative model predicts a local minimum of 1.5 percent in 2010, followed
by values as low as 0.9 percent between 2048 and 2053.
While the two models yield predictions that become increasingly similar
as the forecast horizon lengthens, the baseline model does a noticeably better
job of reproducing historical Japanese saving rates. The low-EIS model has
a root-mean-squared error of 4.6 percentage points during 1961-2002, versus
bind for some individuals for a larger portion of their life cycle.
Joines (2006) also considers the real eﬀects from increased government borrowing that
is ﬁnanced with distortionary taxes. He ﬁnds that if either the labor income tax or the
consumption tax is adjusted, the departures from Ricardian equivalence are modest.
26In the low EIS run γ = 4 and β = 1.01. With this value of β both models have the
same terminal steady-state value of the after-tax real interest rate.
372.9 percentage points for the baseline model. The low-EIS model overstates
the saving rate throughout the 1990s, with an average prediction error of
4.3 percentage points versus 0.9 percentage points for the baseline model.
While the low-EIS model does reproduce many of the short-run changes
in the saving rate (as does the baseline model), it understates the size of
the saving rate in the 1960s observed both in the data and in the baseline
model. The low-EIS model predicts an average saving rate of 13.1 percent for
1961-1970, compared with 19.0 percent in the data and the baseline model’s
prediction of 20.4 percent. The low-EIS model also overstates the average
saving rate declines in the 1990s. It predicts a decline of 9.87 percentage
points during 1990-2000, versus a predicted decline of 6.9 percentage points
for the baseline model and 6.7 percentage points in the data.
We also performed experiments with higher settings of the EIS. If the
model is parameterized to produce an EIS of 1/3, the ﬁt improves and the
root mean-squared error for the saving rate falls to 3.8 percent which is the
same value reported in Section 4 for the CII model.
Our results are reasonably robust to values of the EIS that range between
1/3 and 1. However, the ﬁt of the model deteriorates signiﬁcantly for values
of the EIS below 1/3. Although we don’t pursue these extensions here either
allowing for limited participation in stock-markets as in Guvenen (2006) or
Chien, Cole and Lustig (2007) or modeling home production as in Campbell
and Ludvigson (2001) could lower the range of values of the EIS that renders
our model consistent with Japanese data on the saving rate.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have employed a general equilibrium model with a rich
demographic structure to investigate the implications of aging in Japan for
the evolution of the Japanese saving rate and other variables.
Our model implies that demographic change accounted for between 2
and 3 percentage points of the decline in the Japanese saving rate in the
1990s. In future years the role of demographics is even more important.
According to our projections, the average value of Japanese saving rates
will not exceed 5.2 percent for the remainder of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
38Moreover, this ﬁnding is reasonably robust to alternative assumptions about
demographics and future TFP growth. The population distribution, which
is a key determinant of saving, changes only gradually over time in a highly
predictable way. Thus, even when we posit a robust recovery in total factor
productivity growth, saving rates remain low by historical standards.
In future research we are interested in extending our model to investigate
the implications of aging in Japan for social security and ﬁscal policy. Many
workers in Japan continue to work after they receive full public pension
beneﬁts. One reason for this is that those who continue to work receive a
variety of tax beneﬁts. Many of these beneﬁts are now being removed or
reduced. We are interested in modeling household retirement decisions and
understanding how these decisions are aﬀected by government policy.
39Appendix
A1. Data set
Demographics and survival probabilities
We can construct the model’s complete demographic dynamics from an initial
age distribution of the population, a series of age-1 population, and a series of
survival probabilities. We measure the initial population by age using Japanese
data for 1961. A series of age-1 population is constructed using the historical
(1961-2000) and projected (2001-2050) age-1 population.27 We calculate a series
of survival probabilities in three steps. First, given the initial population by age
and by sex and a series of survival probabilities by age and by sex we construct a
series of population by age and by sex.28 Second, summing over sexes, we get a
closed-economy series of population by age for the period 1961-2050. Third, we use
the series of population by age to construct a series of survival probabilities by age.
The survival probability at age j and time t is calculated as ψj,t = Nj+1,t+1/Nj,t,
where Nj,t is the population of age j at time t. Assuming that survival probabilities
remain constant after 2050 and that the age-1 population growth rate recovers to
zero in 15 years and remains constant thereafter, we recursive construct time-series
of population by age using equation (1).
Labor eﬃciency proﬁle
The labor eﬃciency proﬁle, εj, is constructed from Japanese data on employ-
ment, wages, and weekly hours from 1990 to 2000 following the methodology de-
scribed in Hansen (1993). The data source is the Basic Survey in Wage Structure
by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. The constructed labor eﬃciency
proﬁles are 0.646 (age 20-24), 0.834 (age 25-29), 0.999 (age 30-34), 1.107 (age
35-39), 1.165 (age 40-44), 1.218 (age 45-49), 1.233 (age 50-54), 1.127 (age 55-59),
0.820 (age 60-64), 0.727 (over age 65). We interpolate these values to get labor
eﬃciency by age. For more detail on the methodology constructing those values,
see the data appendix in Braun, et al. (2005).
Capital and wage income tax rates
The capital income tax rate is measured by revenue from the tax on capital
income divided by capital income, and the wage income tax rate is measured by
27The data are available in the National Institute of Population and Social Se-
curity (IPSS) home-page. The IPSS projection has three diﬀerent levels of popu-
lation: low, medium and high. The diﬀerences among the three projections come
entirely from diﬀerences in assumptions about fertility. The three projections use
common survival probabilities. We take the medium projection as our baseline.
28The data on survival probabilities are available only every ﬁve years, and we
interpolate between those years. These data are also available in the IPSS home-
page.
40the sum of direct tax payments by households and social security tax payments
divided by wage income. We use data provided by Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
to get capital income and wage income as well as capital income tax revenue. We
take data on direct taxes on households and the social security tax from the 2000
Annual Report on National Accounts.
Government debt
we calculate net government debt for 1979-2004 following Broda and Weinstein
(2004). The net government debt is sum of the net debts of the Japanese govern-
ment, the postal savings system, and government ﬁnancial institutions. The data
are available only from 1979 and their source is the Bank of Japan Flow of Funds
website. We calculate net government debt for 1961-1978 using data on the gross
government debt and assuming that the ratio of net debt to gross debt is the same
as the average value for 1979-2001. The data source for the gross government debt
is Financial Bureau, Ministry of Finance.
Family scale
The baseline model allows family scale to vary over time in a way that makes
family scale consistent with Japanese data on the under 21 year old population
which are children under the assumption of our model. This section describes how
we calibrate the family scale variables (ηj,t).
A secular decline in the net fertility rate, n1,t, implies a corresponding decline
in the number of children per household and thus in the family scale, ηj,t, for ages
when children are present in the home. We do not have data to allow measurement
of ηj,t on a frequent basis. Instead, we adopt simplifying assumptions that allow
us to estimate ηj,t from information on family scale in 2001 and observations on
the time series of the number of twenty-one-year-olds in the population, N1,t.
Suppose that the number of children born to a household of age j in period
t is given by mj,t = ftmj, where mj is a time-invariant indicator of the relative
number of births occurring in each year of the parent’s life cycle and ft is a time-
varying shock to aggregate fertility. In our model each household contains one
adult, so that the empirical analogue of mj,t is births per adult of age j in period
t. Assume that no births occur before the parent reaches real-time age 21 (model
age 1). Assume further that the mortality rate is zero before real-time age 21.
Finally, assume that children remain in the household until they reach real-time
age 21, at which time they form their own households.
Given the above assumptions, the number of individuals of real-time age 21 (





where the right-hand side is simply the total number of births twenty periods ago.
We have time-series data on Nj,t, the population of age j at each date.
41Let Mj,t denote the total number of children in a household of age j in period t.
The number of children in a household of model age 1 is thus M1,t = m 1,t = ftm1
and the number of children in a household of model age 2 is M2,t = m1,t−1+m2,t =










for j > 20. Note that because ft and mj enter multiplicatively in all relevant
expressions, some normalization assumption is needed to pin down one value of
either ft or mj. The speciﬁc normalization is unimportant for the results, and we
assume f2001 = 1.0.
Given values of ft and mj, we can calculate Mj,t for all j and t. We have
data for 2001 that allow us to estimate the number of children per adult for age
intervals of parents that generally span ﬁve years. From these, we construct by
interpolation an empirical measure of Mj,2001 for each age j. We try to choose
values for ft and mj so that, given our simplifying assumptions, the model values
of Mj,2001 and N1,t closely match their empirical analogues. Because we have data
on age-speciﬁc mortality rates over time, matching N1,t implies that we match the
entire time series of population by age, Nj,t. Note from equation (27) that there
exists one observation on ft for each time-series observation of the population, Nj,t.
Suppose that mj = 0 for j > b j. Our assumption that each child remains at home
for exactly 20 years implies that there are b j + 19 nonzero model values of Mj,2001
corresponding to the b j nonzero values of mj, i.e., the system is over-determined.
Therefore, we are unable to match all the values of Mj,2001 and N1,t exactly. Note
from equation (27) that, given vales for mj, we can pick a sequence of ft so that
the ratio of our model N1,t to the empirical value is constant across t, thus exactly
reproducing the observed values of n1,t, the growth rate of the youngest cohort.
We could, of course, choose values of ft so that this ratio is unity and we match
N1,t exactly but do not match Mj,2001. Achieving a closer ﬁt to Mj,2001 generally
requires a less exact match to the level of the population series. We consider two
calibrations. In one we closely match the N1,t. In the other we closely match the
Mj,2001. Presumably, any other calibration would lie between these two extremes.
We do not employ any analytically derived metric to judge the closeness of the
match to Mj.2001, but instead make judgments based on the visual appearance of
the measured object and its model counterpart. In our baseline simulations, we
employ values of ft and mj that result in a model population series that is three
percent higher than the observed data. As a robustness check, we use alternate
values that match Mj,2001 about as closely as seems possible, resulting in a model
42population series that is 17 percent lower than the data. Both sets of assumptions
result in matrices Mj,t that are hump-shaped in the j dimension, reaching a peak
at about model age 23 in each year. The baseline Mj,t declines from this peak
somewhat more slowly than the alternative. The most striking feature, however,
is that the peak value of Mj,t over the life cycle varies substantially over time.
The peak value of children per adult in 1960 is 1.35 for the baseline calibration
and 1.27 for the alternative. By 2000, the peak has fallen to 0.54 for the baseline
calibration and 0.55 for the alternative.
Children receive a weight of one-half in calculating family scale, so that the
family scale of a household of age j in period t is 1 + Mj,t/2. We have simulated
our baseline model using the alternative calibration for family scale and ﬁnd no
qualitative diﬀerences and only very slight quantitative diﬀerences compared to
the baseline model. For instance, between 1961 and 2001 the maximum diﬀerence
in the saving rate occurs in 1962 and is 0.37 percent.
A2. Simulation methodology
We use ﬁrst-order conditions of the household problem (11)-(15) to compute an
equilibrium. Given factor prices and the condition that the initial and ﬁnal asset
holding is zero, the household problem is a ﬁxed point problem to solve for an
initial consumption to satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions and the budget constraint
from age 1 to J. We can get factor prices if we know ˜ k/h where h = H/N is
the labor input divided by total population. The superscript˜indicates a variable
measured in per-capita eﬃciency units.
Stationary equilibrium
1. Derive the stationary distribution of the population in the steady state.
2. Let (k/h)o and ξo be the guesses of ˜ k/h and ˜ ξ in the steady state. Compute
factor prices {r, ˜ w} and the output ˜ y using (k/h)o.
3. Let co be the guess of ˜ c1. Calculate {˜ cj,˜ aj,lj} forward using the ﬁrst order
conditions and the budget constraint. Reset co so that ˜ aJ = 0. Then recalcu-
late {˜ cj,˜ aj,lj} by setting ˜ c1 = c0. Set (k/h)o = (k/h)n if |(k/h)o−(k/h)n| <
tol where (k/h)n is the new value given (k/h)o and tol is the convergence
tolerance. Otherwise repeat this process until |(k/h)o − (k/h)n| < tol.
4. Given the (k/h)o computed in stage 3, re-do a simulation as stage 3 to get
ξo such that |ξo − ξn| < tol, and calculate new (k/h)n in this loop.
5. If |(k/h)o−(k/h)n| < tol, stop.29. Otherwise set ξo = ξn and go back to the
stage 3.
29In this simulation, the factor markets clear, the household ﬁrst-order conditions
including the budget constraint hold, and the government budget constraint holds.
Then the goods market clears automatically. We calculate excess demand in the
goods market as a consistency check.
43Transitional Dynamics
1. Calculate the ﬁnal steady state.
2. Let {(k/h)o
t} and {ξo
t} be the guesses of {˜ kt/ht} and {˜ ξt} in a transition.
The guess of the ﬁnal period must be same as the corresponding variables
of the ﬁnal steady state. Compute factor prices {rt, ˜ wt} and the output {˜ yt}
using {(k/h)o
t}.
3. For households of age j = 1 and for t = 1,2,...,T compute the series of
consumption, asset and leisure {˜ cj,t,˜ aj,t,lj,t} forward. For households of age
j > 1 at time 1 compute the series {˜ cj,t,˜ aj,t,lj,t} forward given the initial
distribution of asset.
4. Compute the new series {(k/h)n
t , ˜ ξn
t }. If the series converge we get an equi-
librium. Otherwise, set new {(k/h)o
t, ˜ ξo




t , ˜ ξn
t } and go back to stage 2.30
30If it takes too many iterations we may switch the iteration method to the
Broyden method after n iterations. For example n is set to 100. See Judd (1998)
for details on the Broyden method.
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Model calibration and data sources for exogenous variables 
  
     
Preferences     
Subjective discount factor      0.977 
Share of leisure      0.361 
Technology     
Capital share      0.363 
Depreciation rate 
  t   Hayashi and Prescott(2002) 
Labor efficiency profile 
 
  j  Braun, et al.(2005) 
Tax, expenditure and annuity     
Capital income tax rate 
  t
a  Hayashi and Prescott(2002) 
Wage income tax rate 
  t
w  Hayashi and Prescott(2002) 
Social security replacement rate 
  t   Oshio and Yashiro(1997) 
Government purchases 
   Gt / Yt   Hayashi and Prescott(2002) 
Demographics     
Population growth rate 
 nt   IPSS 
Survival probabilities 
   
  j,t   IPSS 
Family scale 
   
 j,t   See data appendix 
Initial conditions     k0  Hayashi and Prescott(2002) 
Initial capital stock     
aj,0  Hayashi, Ando and Ferris(1988) 
Initial asset holding by age     
aj,0  Hayashi, Ando and Ferris(1988) 






Analysis of the implications of demographics for other macroeconomic variables 
     
                 
No changes in fertility and survival probabilities after 1990 
(fertility rate 1% in all periods, survival probabilities unchanged after 1990, and  baseline TFP ) 
Horizon  1990  2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050  2060 
Percentage deviation                 
Consumption  0.10  -1.28  -3.52  -3.07  -0.02  4.70  7.60  9.26 
Capital stock  -3.84  -6.05  -9.12  -9.92  -7.19  -2.11  2.23  5.02 
Labor input  -1.09  -1.27  -1.09  2.47  8.65  16.15  18.89  19.99 
GNP  -2.09  -3.03  -4.08  -2.21  2.62  9.17  12.55  14.33 
                          
*All variables are reported as percentage deviations from the baseline forecast in the same year. A positive 
value indicates that the variable is above its baseline value in that year.  
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Decomposition of Changes Japan National Saving rate into three components
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